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Abstract
Electronic ticketing in public transportation based on smart cards is gaining momen-
tum worldwide. It is widely recognized that a smart card system can deliver benefits 
to both passengers and operators, but due to its complexity, implementation can 
come at a considerable cost. Therefore, it is likely that a commercial appraisal from 
the perspective of the public transportation operator alone would reveal that costs 
are higher than benefits and, hence, economic non-viability. This paper presents 
the experiences of the Norwegian city of Trondheim, which recently implemented 
a fully-interoperable electronic smart card system. A social cost-benefit analysis 
of the scheme is presented, focusing on net overall benefits for the passengers, the 
bus company, the local transportation authority, and the rest of society. The main 
conclusion of the paper is that the smart card ticketing system in Trondheim deliv-
ers a positive net present value. The paper demonstrates that economic evaluation 
of smart card ticketing schemes using the principles of social cost-benefit analysis is 
desirable and possible. Because commercial non-viability may represent constraints 
to the implementation of such schemes, the findings presented in this paper provide 
valuable information to those currently working on smart card ticketing strategies. 
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Background
Electronic ticketing in public transportation based on smart cards is gaining 
momentum worldwide. It is widely recognized that smart cards can deliver ben-
efits to passengers and public transportation operators through time savings, 
increased travel convenience, more flexible ticketing, lower administrative costs, 
and better marketing information. The implementation of smart card systems is, 
however, a complex process that includes legal, economic, and technological issues. 
Implementation can thus come at a considerable cost. Therefore, it is likely that a 
commercial appraisal from the perspective of the public transportation operator 
alone would reveal costs higher than benefits and, hence, economic non-viability. 
Authorities and public transportation operators, therefore, often are reluctant to 
sanction large investments in such systems.
A striking example of transportation investments that may not generate sufficient 
revenues to justify private investment alone is public transportation investments. 
Public transportation often is subsidized to ensure that important services are pro-
vided even if they do not generate sufficient ticket revenues to justify their opera-
tions. Even in countries where the public transportation industry is completely 
deregulated, there is usually some kind of operator reimbursement for services 
such as certain rural routes, school travel, or free travel for older adults. Other argu-
ments for subsidizing public transportation include the positive externalities gen-
erated by the service, the potential for user-scale economics (often referred to as 
the Mohring effect), and alleged public or merit good characteristics. This implies 
that, in reality, very few, if any, investments in public transportation are profitable 
from a purely commercial perspective. When deciding whether to implement 
smart card ticketing systems, the investment should be evaluated from a social 
perspective, following the principles of social cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) is a methodology based on the valuation of all relevant effects 
accruing from an investment or policy. Harberger (1971; cited in Winston 2006) 
described the principles of applied welfare economics through CBA as follows: ben-
efits and costs to consumers should be calculated using consumer surplus; benefits 
and costs to producers should be calculated using producer surplus; and benefits 
and costs to each group should be added without regard to the individual(s) to 
whom they accrue. Thus, it is the change in consumer and/or producer surplus that 
determines the change in social surplus in a CBA. (For a comprehensive review of 
cost-benefit theory and methodology, see Boardman et al. 2006.) In other words, 
CBA is concerned with the welfare of society as a whole and not just a smaller part 
of it. That will be illustrated in this paper.
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This paper presents the experiences of the Norwegian city of Trondheim, which 
recently implemented a fully-interoperable electronic smart card system. A social 
cost-benefit analysis of the scheme is presented, focusing on net overall benefits 
for the passengers, the bus company, the local transportation authority, and the 
rest of society. 
Smart Card Ticketing in Trondheim
The city of Trondheim (pop. 175,000), which is the third largest city in Norway, 
implemented electronic smart cards (the t:card) for its public transportation sys-
tem in June 2008. It is a region-wide scheme in which customers can use one smart 
card based on one contract for buses, trams, and regional coaches operated by 10 
public transportation operators in Trondheim and the 2 counties surrounding the 
city. The total population in the two counties, including Trondheim, is approxi-
mately 425,000. Prior to this implementation, payment was based on a wide array 
of paper-based ticketing schemes. Customers still can pay with cash, but soon after 
implementation, smart card use accounted for approximately 70 percent of all pay-
ments; after more than three years of operation, approximately 90 percent of all 
trips currently are paid for using the t:card. This means that accommodating those 
customers who still pay their fares by cash is becoming more expensive, which 
raises the issue of transferring to full-scale electronic ticketing with no option to 
pay by cash. Customers using the t:card are offered discounts from 5–25 percent, 
depending on whether a pre-paid amount is deposited on the card or if it is linked 
to a bank account. In addition, monthly passes are offered, which gives frequent 
travelers significantly lowers fares than they would pay if purchasing single tickets. 
The single ticket cash fare in Trondheim is $5.30, while the price of a monthly pass 
for the greater Trondheim area is $105. (For more information, see the transit 
authority AtB’s website: www.atb.no.)
In 2009, two thirds of the operating costs of public transportation in Trondheim 
were paid for by ticket revenues (approximately $35 million). The remaining one 
third was covered by local authority subsidies. Ten years ago, the share of subsidies 
to costs was close to zero, but that share has increased due to fare reductions, 
increased operating costs and increased bus frequencies.
The public transportation system in Trondheim is based on 42 bus routes and 1 
tram line. Trains, which are not currently part of the smart card system, carry pas-
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sengers to and from neighboring towns. Currently, the total number of bus trips 
per year is 21 million. 
Until recently, bus services in Trondheim were provided by a direct contract with a 
publicly-owned local bus company, but now are based on gross subsidy tendering, 
where services are planned and managed by the transit authority AtB, a subsidiary 
of Sør-Trøndelag County, where Trondheim is located. With services now tendered, 
the quality of operations is expected to increase due to increased requirements to 
vehicles and services in the call for tenders. Beginning in fall 2011, all services are 
now provided by low-floor buses, which, fulfill the Euro 5 guidelines for emissions. 
New buses also have a rear access option for t:card holders. Although this option 
increases the risk of fraud, it is expected that it will contribute to reduced dwell 
times.
Literature Review
Smart cards are used for a number of different transportation applications, among 
which ticketing is the most widespread. However, despite being invented more 
than 30 years ago, the history of smart cards is littered with a number of spectacu-
lar and costly failures. Regardless, the last 15 years have seen a growing number of 
smart card schemes being launched, many of which are a result of the success of 
large-scale electronic ticketing schemes in Asia (Blythe 2004). This has led to an 
increased interest in investigations into the benefits and costs of smart card ticket-
ing for public transportation. 
In a report by the UK Department for Transport (DfT) and Detica (2009), the net 
present value (NPV) of a national smart ticketing infrastructure over a 10-year 
period was estimated at $36.8 billion with full take-up. Even with a minimal rollout 
of smart cards, the NPV was estimated at $2.8 billion, equivalent to a Benefit-Cost 
Ratio (BCR) of 1.8, which is close to the level considered as a high value for money 
(2.0). The DfT concluded that the installation of smart card infrastructure in UK 
public transportation has large one-off costs but relatively low operating costs. 
The benefits are large and come from factors such as modal shifts, cost savings, 
increased revenue, fraud reduction, better service, and improved access to and 
integration with other services. It is worth noting that the DfT report identified real 
scale economies in the implementation of smart card technology. Although some 
benefits could be gained from partial implementation, real payback is expected 
once a full national interoperable scheme is in place. 
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The view of large potential benefits, however, was not supported by the Confed-
eration of Passenger Transport. In a Local Transport Today article published on 
November 19, 2009, it was argued that the lack of smart card schemes in operation 
was not a result of market failure, but due to an unviable business case for public 
transportation operators and uncertain benefits for all parties involved. Fearnley 
and Johansen (2009) reached the same conclusion in a commercial appraisal of the 
Flexus system for public transportation in Oslo, which is struggling to implement 
an interoperable smart card system for buses, trams, and metro lines in Oslo and 
the neighboring county. The new system provided a negative NPV for the operator, 
and initial assumptions, so far, have turned out to be overly optimistic. 
This is similar to the views of Iseki et al. (2008), who claimed that the benefits of 
smart card systems often are vague and that it is still unclear whether the benefits 
of smart cards outweigh the costs. The authors reviewed three case studies (and, 
according to the authors, the best studies available) of smart card systems in the 
U.S. and concluded that none of the three studies was based on complete and 
consistent applications of accepted cost/benefit methodologies. Their conclusions 
were that smart card systems hold great potential for providing extensive ben-
efits in terms of speed, flexibility, and information, but at substantial time, effort, 
and monetary costs. The limitations of previous studies and the lack of general 
methodologies implied, however, that any study of current smart card schemes 
in operation would require substantial data collection and analysis. In this, Iseki 
et al. identified one of the most serious shortcomings of intelligent transport sys-
tems (ITS) and perhaps of smart card systems in particular: the consistent lack of 
comprehensive economic evaluations to properly appraise the costs and benefits 
of such schemes. As argued by Odeck and Welde (2010), when ITS projects are 
not evaluated according to the same methodologies as traditional transportation 
investments, many potential ITS projects may lose terrain relative to alternative 
solutions. In addition, ITS often represents new applications that are still in their 
early stages in many countries. Ascertaining their expected effects, therefore, 
often is difficult. This might make traditional evaluation methods such as cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) inappropriate. Although frameworks for CBA exist in most 
countries, these are not necessarily suitable for ITS evaluation. In particular, the 
limitations of traditional CBA for ITS evaluation are related to data issues, the 
time horizon, and the valuation of user benefits. Odeck and Welde nevertheless 
concluded that evaluating ITS projects using the principles of cost-benefit analysis 
is desirable and possible. Although there are costs and benefits associated with ITS 
that are difficult to monetize, most of the benefits and costs of ITS schemes, such 
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as electronic payment systems, are measurable in monetary terms and, therefore, 
are suitable for CBA.
One of the very few economic appraisals of smart card technologies was presented 
by Cheung (2006), who analyzed the effects of the Dutch national smart card sys-
tem. Although not necessarily providing benefits to each of the individual opera-
tors involved, the analysis indicated that the project has resulted in large cumula-
tive benefits, with a BCR on the order of 0.2-0.5. The most important direct benefit 
for passengers was the amount of time spent purchasing tickets, while operators 
have benefited from reduced fraud and increased opportunities for more sophis-
ticated price differentiation.
More recently, the ability of smart cards to generate new public transportation 
trips has been highlighted by research by Transport for London and consultant 
MIT. In a Local Transport Today article published on February 25, 2011, TfL’s direc-
tor of fares and ticketing said that, “Research suggested that 9% of all Oyster ‘pay-
as-you-go’ journeys on the Underground were generated by the ease of using the 
Oystercard.” The increased use of public transportation in London due to the Oys-
ter card was estimated to generate some $83 million per year. This has lead to calls 
for Oyster card systems to be implemented in neighboring Scotland to encourage 
bus and rail travel (Wilcox 2011).
Framework for Evaluation
In this paper, the evaluation of the smart card system in Trondheim is based on 
social cost-benefit analysis. Social CBA differs from commercial appraisal in that all 
costs and benefits associated with a particular scheme are included, regardless of 
to whom they accrue. This means that a scheme that involves direct revenues and 
turns out to be non-viable from a commercial perspective still may be desirable 
from a social perspective when all external benefits and costs are included. 
The implementation of an interoperable smart card system in Trondheim was 
motivated by potential benefits for all parties involved and affected by public 
transportation in Trondheim: passengers, operators, local authorities, and the 
wider community. Table 1 outlines the expected impacts for all of the affected 
groups. 
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Table 1. Benefits and Costs—Affected Groups
Passengers PT Operators Local Authorities Wider Community
Time savings Time savings Improved statistics Cost of taxation
Reduced delays Increased reliability Project costs Reduced emissions
Less need to carry cash Project and investment costs
Operating costs
+ +/- -/+ -/+
The introduction of smart cards in public transportation reduces the time spent 
boarding and paying, provided that payment is done when boarding. This consti-
tutes a time saving for each passenger. Although this may be a small and potentially 
negligible time saving for the individual—normally not more than a few seconds—
it is important to note that the individual passenger will save time at every stop and 
for every foregoing passenger who previously would have paid by cash. Over the 
course of an average bus or tram journey, this could constitute a significant time 
saving for both the passengers and the operator(s). This is similar to the user-scale 
economies identified by Mohring (1972), where the presence of an additional user 
increases the likelihood of additional services being provided due to time savings 
and the resulting increased demand. This also is similar to benefits arising from 
measures to improve accessibility to passengers with special needs, often referred 
to as “universal design” (UD). The conventional thinking is that UD is for the few, 
i.e., the impaired, and given that they are few in numbers, UD projects generally 
will be unprofitable from a socioeconomic point of view because benefits will be 
low while investment costs will be high. However, a recent study has shown that 
UD projects may benefit all users of the facility, whether impaired or not, as the 
additional costs of implementation often are low; hence, their NPVs often are high 
and positive (Odeck et al. 2010).
Smart cards often also increase bus route reliability and reduce delays for pas-
sengers. Payment by cash can be a complex process, where the average time per 
passenger varies from a few seconds to more than a minute. This makes scheduling 
difficult. The introduction of smart cards normally reduces this pay time variability 
and, hence, contributes to both reduced delays and increased reliability. 
Another benefit for passengers and operators is a reduced need for cash. Today, 
people are increasingly carrying no cash at all, and the percentage of transactions 
made by credit and debit cards is increasing annually. In 2009, there were 1.2 billion 
card transactions in Norway (up 10% from 2008). This is equivalent to 246 transac-
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tions per person (Norges Bank 2010). Norges Bank, Norway’s central bank, has esti-
mated that cash settles only about 23 percent of transactions at the point of sale, 
representing 14–38 percent of the value of all sales. The ratio of the cash stock to 
GDP in Norway has fallen over the past decades and has fallen considerably faster 
in Norway than in the other Nordic countries (Gresvik and Haare 2008).
It is expected that smart cards, at least initially, increase operating costs for the 
operators involved. These, along with project and investment costs, which are 
shared with local authorities, represent the direct costs of implementing the smart 
card system. In addition, costs financed by the public sector through taxation 
should be multiplied by 1.20, which is the standard marginal cost of public funds 
in Norway, reflecting the fact that distortive taxes lower welfare by more than they 
collect in revenue.
Finally, smart card systems normally provide local authorities with better public 
transportation statistics and ease the planning and scheduling of services. In addi-
tion, operators may benefit from additional information on customer trips, paving 
the way for loyalty schemes and a better understanding of customer needs and 
journey patterns (Davis 2002, in Blythe 2004). It is also not unreasonable to believe 
that, as smart cards reduce dwell time, local emissions could be reduced. This will 
benefit the wider community.
From the above, we notice that most of the envisaged effects can be measured in 
monetary terms, and an economic assessment can be done. In CBA, the relevant 
investment criteria are the net present value (NPV) and the benefit cost ratio 
(BCR).
The NPV can be expressed as follows:
 
(1)
Here, B and C represent benefits and costs, r represents the discount rate, and t 
represents the time period. The NPV determines the absolute economic merit of a 
project. If its value is greater than zero, it means that the project generates benefits 
that are greater than its cost and is therefore profitable from an economic point 
view. 
The BCR is a value for money measurement and is different from the NPV. It is 
defined as the ratio of the net benefits of a project to its costs. Formally, the BCR 
is written as: 
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(2)
The BCR has a simple interpretation, making it useful for policy makers to judge the 
worthiness of projects in terms of returns per euro invested. If the ratio of NPV to 
the total costs of carrying out the project (C) is, for example, 0.2, it means that the 
returns are 20 percent, or a 20-cent profit for every dollar invested in the project. 
In practice, we use the NPV to determine whether a project is profitable from an 
economic point of view. If the aim is to rank ITS projects among themselves or 
against other projects, then the BCR should be used, because it shows which proj-
ects give the greatest returns per dollar invested.
Data and Methodology
Data
The data for the analysis were collected in cooperation with AtB, the body respon-
sible for Trondheim’s public transportation system. Stensrud and Kuipers (2008) 
provided a comprehensive overview of all costs associated with the smart card 
system. Although it was implemented in 2008, the process leading up to imple-
mentation was arduous and prolonged. The planning started in the early 1990s, but 
because implementation turned out to be more complex than was first assumed, 
it was postponed several times. The process even resulted in a court case with the 
equipment supplier, which ended in a settlement in 2007. After the settlement, 
the project was restarted and reorganized. Therefore, as the project contents and 
organization have been so different, the project can be split into two phases: before 
and after the court settlement in 2007. In this paper, we use the costs after 2007 
as the basis for the analysis. The analysis covers only the city of Trondheim and not 
those neighboring regions where the t:card also can be used. 
Time savings usually constitute the largest share of estimated benefits of trans-
portation projects, and the estimation of time saved per passenger, therefore, 
requires careful calculation. The estimated time saving of 6.8 seconds, as shown in 
Table 2, for each boarding passenger using a smart card is based on registrations 
performed by students at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
during the spring of 2009. The means are based on a sample of 900 observations. 
Unfortunately, this was done almost a year after implementation, and we cannot 
rule out the possibility that those still opting for cash payment at this stage repre-
sent the slower payers. The time savings, thus, may be underestimated. As Table 2 
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shows, even smart card transactions take time, but cash is more time-consuming 
and, above all, involves more variability in time spent per passenger, which makes 
scheduling more difficult.
Table 2. Time in Seconds Spent on Cash Payment vs. Smart Card Payment
 Cash Smart Card 
 Transactions Transactions
No. of cases 436 466
Mean 8.3 1.5
St. dev. 6.5 1.8
Minimum 2 1
Maximum 47 18
The analysis is based on measured data after 12–24 months of operation. In addi-
tion to time savings, the data are composed of investment and operating costs, 
reinvestment costs, project costs, bus trips, t:card shares, load factors, and standard 
national values for the value of time and discount rates. The appraisal period is 10 
years. This is considerably shorter than what is used for traditional transportation 
expenditures, which are appraised over a 25-year period. A 10-year appraisal period 
reflects the uncertainty associated with technology investment and ensures a con-
servative approach to the analysis. The main parameters used in the estimation are 
listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Parameters Used in the Estimation
Parameter Value*
Investment costs $2,400,000
Operating costs per year $900,000
Annual service and maintenance costs $200,000
Reinvestment costs (every three years) $1,400,000
Project costs (before implementation) $1,400,000
Total number of bus trips per year 17,300,000
Share of trips performed with the t:card 70% in 2008, 80% in 2009, 90% thereafter
Annual increase in the number of bus trips 2.5%
Average time saving per t:card transaction 6.8 seconds
Average load factor 20
Time value for bus passengers 12.5/hour
Time value for bus company 65.9/hour
Discount rate 4.5%
Appraisal period 10 years
Marginal cost of public funds 20%
*U.S dollars—values based on exchange rate of August 15, 2011
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The Norwegian framework for CBA of transport investment provides guidelines for 
project appraisal, including standard values of time, marginal cost of public funds, 
and the discount rate.
Methodology
The average time saving per passenger is estimated to be 6.8 seconds for each time 
a boarding passenger uses a smart card instead of paying by cash. Notice that this 
does not mean that each smart card transaction represents a time saving. The 
previous paper-based ticketing arrangements also included monthly passes, which 
holders would simply display to the bus driver. This proportion of users would not 
generate time savings when switching to the t:card.
This means that the total gross time savings t per year, measured in hours for pas-
sengers using smart cards, can be expressed as follows:
 
(3)
where Pt:card is the total number of passengers using smart cards per year, and tksec 
denotes the average time savings per smart card transaction.
The net annual time savings for all passengers is expressed as:
 (4)
Here, the time saving for smart card users is adjusted for m, the proportion of users 
with monthly passes in the last year before smart card implementation. In addition, 
the equation includes time savings for passengers already on the bus (the average 
load factor), BP. These passengers also will save time at each bus stop whenever a 
boarding passenger uses a smart card.
The annual value of time savings can then easily expressed as:
 (5)
Here, wp and wb express the value of travel time savings for bus passengers and the 
bus company, respectively.
By including investment costs and operating costs and inserting Bt into Equation 
(1), we are able to calculate the NPV of the smart card ticketing system in Trond-
heim. 
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Results
Based on the data and methodology presented above, a cost-benefit analysis was 
performed. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Smart Card System in Trondheim
 NPV Costs* NPV Benefits NPV
Investment costs ($2,400,000)  
Project costs ($1,400,000)  
Operating and reinvestment costs ($12,000,000)  
Marginal cost of public funds ($800,000)  
Time savings of bus passengers  32,800,000 
Time savings of bus company  16,300,000 
NPV (16,600,000) 49,100,000 32,500,000
BCR   1.96
The smart card ticketing system in Trondheim is profitable from a socioeconomic 
point of view, with an NPV of $32.5 million. This equals a BCR of 1.96, meaning 
that $1 spent on the t:card system generates benefits of $2.96. This is also sub-
stantially more than what is usually provided through traditional transportation 
expenditure, which, in the Norwegian case, may struggle to deliver a positive NPV 
at all. This analysis differs from one that a transit agency or a public transportation 
operator typically might carry out in two respects, in that it includes the costs of 
funds financed by taxation and, most importantly, it includes the values of travel 
time savings for both bus passengers and the bus company.
The implementation of smart card ticketing is a complex process, involving a num-
ber of actors and requiring readjustments for both operators and passengers. It 
often takes time before all challenges are overcome and before all benefits can be 
realized. In our opinion, the long-term objective should be to abolish cash payment 
completely. This will increase the social surplus further through the elimination of 
the need to handle cash—an expensive operation. In some countries, abolishing 
cash payment is said to be unrealistic, as certain income groups do not qualify for 
credit card payments or pre-paid card payments. That may be true for activities 
such as grocery shopping, but public transportation ticketing systems, which are 
based on small amounts, usually do not rely fully on customers qualifying for credit 
or who have their travel card accounts linked to a bank account. Both the t:card 
in Trondheim and the Oyster card in London allow users to store a pre-paid cash 
amount on the card regardless of creditworthiness. 
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In time, it should also be a realistic objective to reduce the costs of operating the sys-
tem. The first years of a new ticketing system often have a high number of customer 
inquiries, but as users become familiar with the system and take advantage of more 
efficient ways to manage their contracts, savings could be realized. It is also worth 
noting that conservative estimates were used throughout the analysis. It is likely 
that the NPV of Trondheim’s smart card system is higher than that estimated above. 
There are a number of benefits that are not monetized and included in the analysis. 
One such benefit is the above-mentioned reduced need for cash. For bus drivers, 
large amounts of cash pose a security risk. During the last five years, there have 
been several robberies and attempted robberies on buses in Trondheim, and the 
union representing the drivers has suggested a complete removal of all cash on 
board the buses. In Sweden, work to remove cash from buses is in progress in sev-
eral cities (Rathe 2008), and the t:card could therefore be a step in the direction of 
cashless public transportation in Trondheim.
Another non-monetized benefit is the improved quality of public transportation 
statistics. Accurate travel information is important for transportation research, 
policy analysis, and planning. Previous paper-based systems failed to provide plan-
ners with necessary information. Statistics were incomplete and consisted of a 
limited set of information needed for analysis and planning. Previously, the bus 
company in Trondheim, which was responsible for collecting the data, even failed 
to provide information on the development in the number of bus passengers from 
one year to the next. The introduction of smart cards has improved this situation, 
and now detailed statistics on the number of trips per bus service, including time 
of day and day of week, are available. It is expected that this information could be 
used to improve the quality of public transportation in Trondheim.
Trondheim’s smart card system generates substantial time savings for both pas-
sengers and operators. Take a 5-kilometer bus service with 10 stops as an example. 
At an average speed of 15 kilometers per hour, the trip will take 19 minutes, 48 sec-
onds. If, at each stop, two of the passengers boarding are previous cash payers, this 
will generate a total time savings of two minutes. Depending on where passengers 
board along the route, this could constitute a time savings of up to 10 percent. It 
is not unreasonable to expect that this time savings could increase the demand 
for public transportation. Rødseth and Bang (2006) used a travel time elasticity 
of −0.26, whereas Balcombe et al. (2004) reported long-run travel time elasticities 
between −0.38 and −0.69. This means that a 10 percent reduction in travel time 
along a bus route could generate passenger growth on the order of 3–7 percent. 
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Introducing smart cards and increasing the efficiency of ticketing, hence, could be 
efficient tools in increasing the demand for public transportation and promoting a 
modal shift away from private cars. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the smart card ticketing system in Trond-
heim delivers a positive net present value. For bus passengers, the main benefit lies 
in time savings during boarding and reduced dwell time. Although these represent 
only a small time saving for the individual, all passengers already on the bus will 
save time at every stop when passengers pay using smart cards, so the total time 
savings due to the t:card could be considerable over the course of a bus trip. This is 
an example of user-scale economics. Further passenger benefits include increased 
timetable reliability and a reduced need for cash. The bus company benefits from 
reduced delays and increased reliability because of the shorter time spent at bus 
stops. This could allow the bus company to reduce the number of buses needed or 
increase the service level to passengers. 
This paper has demonstrated that economic evaluation of smart card ticketing 
schemes using the principles of social cost-benefit analysis is desirable and possible. 
Even if all effects are not monetized and included in the analysis, the main costs and 
benefits are, and because the non-included non-monetized effects mostly would 
have increased the net benefits of the scheme, we consider the analysis to be robust 
and, if anything, erring on the pessimistic side. Because commercial non-viability 
often constrains the implementation of smart card schemes, these findings provide 
valuable information to those currently working on smart card ticketing strategies. 
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